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Alberto R. Gonzales* 
Donald Q. Cochran** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
You are a police officer working the night shift in a major U.S. city.  In 
the dark hours of the early morning, you come across a group of young males 
in a part of the city known for criminal activity.  When they see your patrol 
car, the young men stop what they are doing and look away quickly.  All of 
your training, as well as the instincts that you have developed over years pa-
trolling these same streets, tells you to stop and at least attempt to start a con-
versation with the group to determine whether criminal activity is afoot and 
perhaps prevent it.  There is, however, a nagging thought in the back of your 
head.  Isn’t it possible – or perhaps likely – that someone in the group or 
nearby will have a video device and record the encounter?  What if the crowd 
attempts to provoke a confrontation and then records it?  What if the record-
ing is posted to the Internet or sent to the media?  Should such thoughts tem-
per your judgment in this situation?  Would they make you hesitate to get out 
of the car?  Would it make a difference to you if you knew that you were 
wearing a body camera – one that you controlled, that would record your 
view of the situation, with images that could not be disposed of or edited after 
the fact by someone intending to deprive viewers of necessary context? 
This Article explores the questions raised by this scenario, focusing on 
police-worn body cameras, the role these cameras may play in officer-citizen 
encounters, and the resolution of legal disputes that arise from such encoun-
ters.  Part II discusses what role, if any, citizen-recorded videos and the effect 
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they have on society play in the prevalence of crime – what has sometimes 
been called the “Ferguson effect.”  Part III explores the role police-worn body 
cameras could play in counteracting any such effect, addressing arguments in 
favor of body cameras and exploring their potential to encourage positive 
police and citizen behavior.  Part IV then considers potential concerns about 
the use of body cameras, exploring arguments against their use and their po-
tential to hinder police behavior.  Finally, Part V offers conclusions and rec-
ommendations on the issue of police-worn body cameras. 
II.  THE “FERGUSON EFFECT” 
Police officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown on August 
9, 2014, in Ferguson, Missouri.1  Although an investigation by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”) later cleared Officer Wilson of federal wrongdo-
ing in the shooting,2 a parallel investigation by the Civil Rights Division of 
the DOJ concluded that the City of Ferguson’s law enforcement practices 
revealed a “pattern or practice of unlawful conduct.”3  Regardless, wide-
spread rioting and looting occurred in Ferguson in the aftermath of the Brown 
shooting and again after a state grand jury’s decision not to indict Officer 
Wilson.4 
In November 2014, three months after the shooting, St. Louis Police 
Chief Sam Dotson was interviewed regarding preparations for the upcoming 
announcement of the grand jury’s decision.  During the interview, Chief Dot-
son was apparently the first to use the phrase “Ferguson effect,”5 noting that 
“[i]t’s the Ferguson effect. . . . I see it not only on the law enforcement side, 
but the criminal element is feeling empowered by the environment.”6  Chief 
 
 1. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY 
FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON 4 (2015), https://www. 
justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-mdpa/legacy/2015/03/18/DOJ%20Report%20on% 
20Shooting%20of%20Michael%20Brown.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 5 (“[T]he Department has concluded that Darren Wilson’s actions do 
not constitute prosecutable violations under the applicable federal criminal civil rights 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242, which prohibits uses of deadly force that are ‘objectively 
unreasonable[]’ . . . .”). 
 3. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 4. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Of-
ficer Is Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html?_r=0. 
 5. Richard Rosenfeld, Documenting and Explaining the 2015 Homicide Rise: 
Research Directions, NAT’L INST. JUST. 18 (June 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/249895.pdf. 
 6. Christine Byers, Crime up After Ferguson and More Police Needed, Top St. 
Louis Area Chiefs Say, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 15, 2014), http:// 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985492 
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Dotson did not clarify what he meant by “the environment.”  The comment, 
however, occurred during a discussion of a rise in assaults and robberies since 
the shooting, coupled with a drop in arrests, due at least in part to the fact that 
officers had been pulled away from their normal duties for specialized train-
ing in civil unrest.7 
The phrase “Ferguson effect” has subsequently evolved to have two dis-
tinct meanings.8  One meaning – apparently the dominant one – is the “de-
policing” interpretation.9  Under this view, the “Ferguson effect” occurs when 
“highly publicized incidents of police use of deadly force against minority 
citizens, including but not limited to the Ferguson incident, cause[] police 
officers to disengage from their duties, particularly proactive tactics that pre-
vent crime.”10  The second meaning, however, shifts the focus from police 
inaction to “chronic discontent” in the African-American community.11  This 
explanation postulates that the effect occurs when longstanding grievances 
with policing in African-American communities are activated by controver-
sial incidents.12  When such incidents involve the use of force by police, they 
cause this chronic discontent to explode into violence.13 
The next significant use of the phrase occurred in May 2015, when col-
umnist Heather Mac Donald used it in a Wall Street Journal op-ed entitled 
The New Nationwide Crime Wave.14  Mac Donald clearly adopted a “de-
policing” interpretation of the term, reporting that when Chief Dotson used 
the phrase to describe the criminal element’s empowerment, it was the result 
of cops “disengaging from discretionary enforcement activity.”15  Mac Don-
ald noted that the first half of 2014, prior to the Ferguson incident, had con-
tinued a twenty-year pattern of declining crime.16  After the Ferguson inci-
dent, however, the trend appeared to be reversing due to a demonization of 
law enforcement that was causing police to abandon the type of proactive 
policing that had been their most powerful weapon in reducing crime.17  Mac 
Donald ended on this ominous note: “[U]nless the demonization of law en-
 
www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/crime-up-after-ferguson-and-more-p 
olice-needed-top-st/article_04d9f99f-9a9a-51be-a231-1707a57b50d6.html. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 2. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 18. 
 11. Id. at 2. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.; see also Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, The New Nationwide Crime 
Wave, WALL STREET J. (May 29, 2015, 6:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-
new-nationwide-crime-wave-1432938425. 
 14. See generally Mac Donald, supra note 13. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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forcement ends, the liberating gains in urban safety over the past 20 years 
will be lost.”18 
The first evidence that Mac Donald’s dire predictions might be coming 
true on a national scale came in September 2015.  A front-page article in the 
New York Times entitled Murder Rates Rising Sharply in Many U.S. Cities 
began: “Cities across the nation are seeing a startling rise in murders after 
years of declines . . . .”19  The article noted that more than thirty cities had 
reported increases in violence from the preceding year.20  Although mention-
ing the phrase “Ferguson effect,” the article did not attempt to tie the rise to 
any one cause, merely noting that “[s]ome officials say intense national scru-
tiny of the use of force by the police has made officers less aggressive and 
emboldened criminals, though many experts dispute that theory.”21 
Not long after the Times story appeared, U.S. Attorney General Loretta 
Lynch called a meeting of big city mayors and police chiefs in Washington, 
D.C. to discuss the issue.22  It was at this meeting that FBI Director James 
Comey first publicly speculated that the rise in crime might be due to a reduc-
tion in police activity.23  Director Comey expounded on this theory several 
days later in a speech at the University of Chicago Law School by attributing 
the rise to a “chill wind that has blown through American law enforcement 
over the last year.”24  Although acknowledging that his view was anecdotal 
and lacked data, Director Comey observed that lives are saved by “actual, 
honest-to-goodness, up-close ‘What are you guys doing on this corner at 1 
o’clock in the morning’ policing” and that there will be consequences if this 
type of policing “drift[s] away from us in the age of viral videos.”25 
Director Comey continued his assertion that de-policing was behind the 
rise in crime into 2016.  In May of that year, after a private briefing on rising 
crime rates for the first quarter of the year, Director Comey observed that “a 
whole lot more people are dying this year than last year, and last year than the 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Murder Rates Rising Sharply in Many U.S. 
Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2015, at A1. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. John Byrne, Emanuel Blames Chicago Crime Uptick on Officers Second-
Guessing Themselves, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/local/politics/ct-emanuel-fetal-police-met-20151012-story.html; see also Rosen-
feld, supra note 5, at 4. 
 23. Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 4. 
 24. Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Chief Links Scrutiny of Police 
with Rise in Violent Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2015/10/24/us/politics/fbi-chief-links-scrutiny-of-police-with-rise-in-violent-cri 
me.html (internal quotations omitted). 
 25. Id. 
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year before and I don’t know why for sure.”26  Although rejecting the term 
“Ferguson effect,” Director Comey said that he is continuing to hear that 
many police are pulling back from aggressive confrontations with the public 
due to viral videos and that this phenomenon could be an important factor in 
the rising crime rates.27 
Not everyone agreed with the FBI Director.  President Obama countered 
Director Comey’s speech, saying he saw no evidence that police officers were 
policing less aggressively, and Director Comey was cherry picking the data.28  
In response to Director Comey’s later comments, White House Press Secre-
tary Josh Earnest said, “[T]here’s not evidence at this point to link that surge 
in violent crime to the so-called viral video effect, or the Ferguson effect.”29  
The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School took exception to both 
aspects of Director Comey’s argument.  First, in its analysis of the 2015 
crime numbers, the Center took exception to the assertion that crime was 
rising.30  Noting that “[t]here is no evidence of a deviation from the histori-
cally low levels of violence the country has been experiencing,” the report’s 
authors concluded that “murder rates vary widely from year to year, and there 
is little evidence of a national coming wave in violent crime.”31  Moreover, to 
the extent that homicides had increased nationally, the report’s authors ob-
served that more than half the increase occurred in three cities: Baltimore, 
Chicago, and Washington, D.C.32  All three cities had falling populations, 
higher poverty rates, and higher unemployment than the national average, 
which the authors opined could contribute to the increase in homicides.33 
Richard Rosenfeld, a professor at the University of Missouri at St. Lou-
is, was an early critic of the idea that the “Ferguson effect” exists.  His belief 
was grounded in his research conducted on crime in the St. Louis area.34  
 
 26. Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Director Says “Viral Video Effect” Blunts Police 
Work, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/12/us/comey-
ferguson-effect-police-videos-fbi.html (internal quotations omitted). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, The Nationwide Crime Wave Is Building, 
WALL STREET J. (May 23, 2016, 7:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-
nationwide-crime-wave-is-building-1464045462. 
 29. Mark Berman, “We Have a Problem.” Homicides Are up Again This Year in 
More Than Two Dozen Major U.S. Cities., WASH. POST (May 14, 2016), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/05/14/we-have-a-problem-homicides 
-are-up-again-this-year-in-more-than-two-dozen-major-u-s-
cities/?utm_term=.27c549f3e7f2 (internal quotations omitted). 
 30. See MATTHEW FRIEDMAN, NICOLE FORTIER & JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIME IN 2015: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 15 (2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Crime_In_2015.pdf. 
 31. AMES GRAWERT & JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIME IN 
2015: A FINAL ANALYSIS 1 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
analysis/Crime_in_2015_A_Final_Analysis.pdf. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Davey & Smith, supra note 19. 
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Because homicides began rising in St. Louis prior to the Michael Brown kill-
ing, Rosenfeld noted, “[O]ther factors may be in play.”35 
Rosenfeld decided, however, to expand his research from just St. Louis 
to a national study.  Funded by a grant from the DOJ’s National Institute of 
Justice, Professor Rosenfeld studied nationwide data in an attempt to answer 
two questions: (1) did homicide rates increase nationally, and, if so, how sig-
nificant and widespread was the increase; and (2) was the rise caused by hesi-
tancy on the part of police to do their jobs?36 
To answer the first question, Professor Rosenfeld looked at crime statis-
tics provided by the police departments of fifty-six large U.S. cities.37  Based 
on this data, he found that the homicide rate in these fifty-six cities rose col-
lectively by 16.8% over the previous year – a rise that Rosenfeld found to be 
“real” and “comparatively large.”38  Rosenfeld found these results worrisome, 
noting that “these aren’t flukes or blips, this is a real increase.”39  Professor 
Rosenfeld responded to the Brennan Center’s interpretation of the 2015 data40 
by stating, “The conclusion one draws from the Brennan Center’s report is, 
‘Not much changed,’ and that is simply not true.  In the case of homicide, a 
lot did change, in a very short period of time.”41 
Rosenfeld’s conclusion appears to be confirmed by the FBI’s recently 
released 2015 Uniform Crime Report (“UCR”).42  For cities with populations 
over 250,000, the UCR shows that homicides increased by 14.5% during 
2015.43  Thus, the murder rate rose nationally more in a single year than it 
 
 35. Id.; see also Lois Beckett, Is the “Ferguson Effect” Real? Researcher Has 
Second Thoughts, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2016, 4:23 PM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/us-news/2016/may/13/ferguson-effect-real-researcher-richard-rosenfield-second-
thoughts (“For nearly a year, Richard Rosenfeld’s research on crime trends has been 
used to debunk the existence of a ‘Ferguson effect’ . . . .”). 
 36. Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 4. 
 37. All but one of the cities – Salt Lake City – had populations over 250,000.  Id. 
at 5.  Thus, Professor Rosenfeld found the fifty-six-city sample to be a “reasonable 
proxy” for the seventy to eighty cities with populations over 250,000 that constitute 
“Group I” cities in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report.  Id. at 6. 
 38. Id. at 6, 10.  See also Haeyoun Park & Josh Katz, Murder Rates Rose in a 
Quarter of the Nation’s 100 Largest Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/08/us/us-murder-rates.html. 
 39. Beckett, supra note 35 (internal quotations omitted). 
 40. FRIEDMAN, FORTIER & CULLEN, supra note 30. 
 41. Beckett, supra note 35 (internal quotations omitted).  Another interesting 
finding of Rosenfeld was that of the fifty-six cities, ten accounted for two-thirds of 
the increase, experiencing a 33% rise in homicide.  Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 10.  
Taking a closer look at what differentiated these ten cities, Rosenfeld noted the key 
difference was that they had African-American populations that were twice as large as 
the other cities (40.8% compared to 19.9%).  Id. 
 42. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: 2015 
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.12 (2016), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/ 
crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-12. 
 43. See id. 
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had in nearly half a century.44  Moreover, despite the Brennan Center’s initial 
skepticism that there was an increase in the murder rate at all, it now projects 
that the murder rate in 2016 will rise by 14% and the two-year increase in the 
murder rate from 2014 to 2016 will be 31.5%.45 
After finding a significant increase in homicides in 2015, Rosenfeld 
moved to his second question: why the rise?  He began by noting the nature 
of this inquiry – that he was not looking to explain a long-term trend but in-
stead for a short-term trend reversal.46  Put simply, he asked “why homicide 
rates would suddenly increase after falling for over two decades.”47  In con-
ducting his analysis, he made what he opined was a reasonable assumption: 
“[W]hatever factors lay behind the 2015 homicide rise should themselves 
have exhibited comparably abrupt changes at the same time or shortly be-
fore.”48  Looking at recent societal changes that could possibly explain a sud-
den and dramatic rise in murders, Rosenfeld saw only three possibilities: (1) 
an expansion in urban drug markets coinciding with the recent rise in heroin 
and opioid abuse, (2) recent reductions in prison population, or (3) some ver-
sion of the “Ferguson effect.”49 
On its face, the drug market explanation seemed plausible.  After all, 
there has been an undisputable increase in drug overdose deaths due to an 
increase in heroin and other opioid use.50  Moreover, there is historical prece-
dent for a correlation between a rise in drug use and crime rate, as a rise in the 
use of crack cocaine in the 1980s and early 1990s did in fact lead to a rise in 
the urban homicide rate.51  Rosenfeld, however, expressed skepticism that the 
“urban drug market” theory explains the rise.52  The primary reason for his 
skepticism was that the sharp rise in heroin overdose deaths began in 2011, 
 
 44. Timothy Williams & Monica Davey, U.S. Murders Surged in 2015, F.B.I. 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/us/murder-
crime-fbi.html. 
 45. MATTHEW FRIEDMAN, AMES C. GRAWERT & JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUSTICE, CRIME IN 2016: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 1 (2016), https:// 
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Crime_2016_Preliminary_An
alysis.pdf.  See also MATTHEW FRIEDMAN, AMES GRAWERT & JAMES CULLEN, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIME IN 2016: UPDATED ANALYSIS 1 (2016), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Crime_in_2016_Updated_
Analysis.pdf. 
 46. Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 10. 
 47. Id. at 11. 
 48. Id. at 12. 
 49. Id. 
 50. The overdose death rate more than doubled from 1999 to 2014, and in 2014, 
heroin and opioids caused over 40,000 overdose deaths in the United States.  Id. at 13.  
See also Lenny Bernstein, Deaths from Opioid Overdoses Set a Record in 2014, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/ 
wp/2015/12/11/deaths-from-heroin-overdoses-surged-in-2014/. 
 51. Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 13; see also Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, 
Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 11–13 (1995). 
 52. Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 14. 
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and there was no reasonable explanation as to why a corresponding rise in the 
homicide rate should lag almost five years behind if drug markets were the 
cause.53 
Likewise, the recent reduction in the prison population fails to explain 
the sudden and dramatic increase in homicides.54  Although there has clearly 
been a falling imprisonment rate in the United States, and it is undisputed that 
released prisoners are arrested at a rate much greater than the general popula-
tion,55 timing also makes this explanation problematic.  The number of state 
and federal inmates peaked in 2009 and has been falling ever since.56  Thus, 
Rosenfeld found this explanation, like the urban drug market theory, simply 
unable to account for the “sheer abruptness” of the 2015 increase.57 
“The only explanation that gets the timing right,” according to Rosen-
feld, “is a version of the Ferguson effect.”58  While the causes of violence and 
the reasons for crime trends remain complex and only partially understood,59 
Rosenfeld asserts that the most probable explanation for this spike in homi-
cide rates is some version of the “Ferguson effect.”60  Rosenfeld acknowledg-
es that “[w]e don’t yet have the data to understand the mechanism for the 
Ferguson effect.”61  However, Rosenfeld leans toward the lost trust in polic-
ing mechanisms rather than the de-policing version of the effect advocated by 
Director Comey and Heather Mac Donald.62 
While it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that the “Ferguson ef-
fect” is the direct cause of the large spike in homicide rates, especially con-
sidering the multifactorial nature of cause and effect, it does appear to be the 
most plausible explanation.  Moreover, it is apparent that many aspects of 
what is called the “Ferguson effect” – such as citizen-recorded videos, posts 
of videos on the Internet, and aggressive confrontations with police officers – 
are now simply a reality of modern policing that police officers must come to 
terms with. 
 
 53. Id. at 15. 
 54. Id. at 16. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, https:// 
www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps (navigate to the “Yearend custody population” table); 
see also Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 16. 
 57. Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 20. 
 58. Beckett, supra note 35 (internal quotations omitted). 
 59. For example, even the causes of the dramatic drop in crime since the early 
1990s are still in dispute and not fully understood.  Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 62. Id.  See generally Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, More on the “Ferguson 
Effect,” and Responses to Critics, WASH. POST (July 21, 2016), https://www.washing 
tonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/07/21/more-on-the-ferguson-effect-
and-responses-to-critics/?utm_term=.1e6c8b582e94. 
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III.  CAN POLICE-WORN BODY CAMERAS COUNTERACT ANY 
EXISTING FERGUSON EFFECT? 
If the “Ferguson effect” is a reality, it either takes the de-policing form 
advocated by Director Comey and Heather Mac Donald, the “lost legitimacy” 
of the police in African-American communities form as suspected by Profes-
sor Rosenfeld, or surfaces from some combination of these forces.  A ques-
tion then arises about whether anything can be done to counteract such an 
effect.  Specifically, could the police use of body-worn cameras impact either 
or both versions of the effect?  Part A of this section discusses the effect of 
police body cameras on police actions in light of the fact that de-policing is 
the driving force behind the “Ferguson effect.”  Part B then discusses the 
potential effect police body cameras may have if the driving force is actually 
the lost legitimacy of the police in African-American communities rather than 
de-policing. 
A.  Police-Worn Body Cameras and De-Policing 
Return to the scenario presented in the introduction – a classic example 
of what Director Comey calls “what are you guys doing on this corner at 1 
o’clock in the morning?” policing.63  De-policing occurs whenever a police 
officer decides not to get out of a patrol car for fear that the encounter will be 
recorded for public release, and the recording may portray the officer in a 
negative light.64 
Most, if not all, police departments have standard procedures in place to 
cover many situations that officers encounter.  There is, however, no question 
that standard procedures only cover a fraction of the myriad of possible situa-
tions that police officers may face.  As a result, many situations arise in 
which the decision to take action is largely or entirely a matter of discretion-
ary policy decisions by individual officers, possibly in conjunction with part-
ners or other officers at the scene.  In light of the decentralized nature of these 
decisions, it seems reasonable to assume that the risk of confrontation and 
highly visible exposure might cause at least a fair number of police officers to 
hesitate to take actions that they might have taken in the past.65 
 
 63. Schmidt & Apuzzo, supra note 24. 
 64. Id. 
 65. The 2015 UCR statistics provide support for the argument that some measure 
of de-policing is occurring, as they show that arrests of juveniles for all offenses de-
creased by 8.4% in 2015, and adult arrests decreased by 3%.  FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, Persons Arrested, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: 2015 CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Sept. 2016), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-
u.s.-2015/persons-arrested/persons-arrested.  See also Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, 
Ferguson Effect Detractors Are Wrong, MANHATTAN INST. (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/ferguson-effect-detractors-are-wrong-8667. 
html (arrests in St. Louis City and County down by one-third after the Brown shoot-
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Can police officers wearing body cameras have an impact on such con-
duct, effectively serving as something of an antidote to any “de-policing” that 
is occurring and, thus, to the “Ferguson effect”?  Return again for a moment 
to the role of our hypothetical police officer, and consider the effect of adding 
a police-worn body camera to the equation.  Would this tip the balance in 
favor of a decision to get out of the car and talk to the young men?  A body-
worn camera, unlike one held by a citizen, will show events from the perspec-
tive of the police officer, giving viewers a sense of what the officer sees and 
hears (or does not see or hear).  This could be helpful to the officer and thus 
encourage the officer to take action for two reasons: (1) the officer’s perspec-
tive is the legally relevant perspective, and (2) it gives context to the final 
frames often recorded by citizens. 
First, legally, the officer’s perspective is the one that matters if an alle-
gation of excessive force is made.  In determining whether an officer used 
excessive force, the courts will look to whether the action was reasonable, 
and “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from 
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 
vision of hindsight.”66  Accordingly, a police body camera video will provide 
a court with the view that legally matters.  Moreover, in the court of public 
opinion, the public’s ability to see what the officer saw is critical to under-
standing the officer’s actions.  It is the view most capable of putting the pub-
lic in the officer’s position and giving them the context needed to determine 
whether or not the actions taken were reasonable.  Additionally, the presence 
of a body camera that the officer controls can ensure that the public does not 
see only the provocative piece of the encounter.67  If operated properly, such 
cameras will guarantee that the entire interaction is recorded and preserved so 
that the focus is not solely on the final frame of the incident, and a reviewing 
court or the public will be able to see the events leading up to the final part of 
the encounter.68 
 
ing and misdemeanor drug arrests in Baltimore down one-third through November 
2015). 
 66. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).  See also Karson Kampfe, 
Police-Worn Body Cameras: Balancing Privacy and Accountability Through State 
and Police Department Action, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1167 (2015) (noting that po-
lice-worn body cameras “create an objective record of an interaction from the of-
ficer’s point of view”). 
 67. Kampfe, supra note 66, at 1168. 
 68. Id.  Of course, critics counter that police may fail to record certain encoun-
ters or delete them once recorded.  Chapter Four Considering Police Body Cameras, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1806 (2015) (“[O]nce the locus of control shifts to the of-
ficers, the very organization meant to be held accountable will be able to prevent 
these videos from being created in the first instance or shared after the fact.”).  How-
ever, given the prevalence of recording devices in the general public today and likeli-
hood that the number will only increase, an officer’s failure to record an encounter 
will likely not prevent the encounter from being recorded but merely ensure that it is 
only documented by someone else, resulting in a lost opportunity to have the public 
see the officer’s view of events.  Kampfe, supra note 66, at 1166 (noting that it was 
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Body cameras also may encourage police action (and thus counteract 
de-policing) due to their potential to have a civilizing effect on citizens in 
such encounters.69  Such an effect is explained by the theory of self-
awareness, which holds that people are less likely to engage in socially unde-
sirable behavior if they know they are being watched.70  This civilizing effect 
also operates on the other party in the encounter – the police officer.71  In a 
one-year study in which officers were randomly assigned to wear body cam-
eras, researchers found that those wearing cameras used force half as often as 
those who did not and had only one-tenth as many citizen complaints filed 
against them.72  Although it is not entirely clear whether this result is due to 
improved police behavior, improved citizen behavior, or some combination 
of the two,73 what is clear is that police-worn body cameras improved officer-
citizen encounters.  In addition, the cameras also appear to produce a 
measureable decrease in de-policing, as the department had 3000 more of-
ficer-citizen contacts during the year of the experiment.74 
In another study of 2000 police officers across seven different depart-
ments, researchers found a 93% reduction in complaints against officers when 
 
estimated, by the end of 2014, 80% of the public would have cellphones capable of 
video recording). 
 69. Kampfe, supra note 66, at 1162. 
 70. Id.  For the camera to have this effect on citizens who interact with police, 
they must know that they are being filmed by the camera, which can be accomplished 
with an announcement by the officer or a visual signal like a light on the camera.  See 
Barak Ariel, William A. Farrar & Alex Sutherland, The Effect of Police Body-Worn 
Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Random-
ized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 516 (2015) 
(“[C]ameras . . . drive us to compliance.  If we become aware that a video-camera is 
recording our actions, we may also become more conscious that unacceptable behav-
iors will be captured on film, and that detection is perceived as certain.”). 
 71. LINDSAY MILLER ET AL., OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 2 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ 
resources/472014912134715246869.pdf; see also Lee Rankin, On-Officer Body Cam-
era System: End of Program Evaluation & Recommendation, AXON FLEX (Sept. 27, 
2014), https://issuu.com/leerankin6/docs/final_axon_flex_evaluation_12-3-13-; SPI: 
Phoenix Police Department Body-Worn Camera Project, ARIZ. ST. U. SCH. 
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST., http://coppfs3.asu.edu/news-events/news/spi-phoenix-
police-department-body-worn-camera-project (last visited Mar. 12, 2017). 
 72. Ariel, Farrar & Sutherland, supra note 70, at 523; see also MICHAEL D. 
WHITE, DIAGNOSTIC CTR., OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GS23F-
9755H, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 6 (2014), 
https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/spotlight/download/Police%20
Officer%20Body-Worn%20Cameras.pdf; Chapter Four Considering Police Body 
Cameras, supra note 68, at 1801. 
 73. WHITE, supra note 72, at 6. 
 74. Id. at 21 n.11. 
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they were wearing body cameras.75  The cameras apparently reduced both 
unfounded complaints and police aggression and actually improved the be-
havior of officers more than citizens.76  Therefore, it appears that police-worn 
body cameras have the potential to counteract, and may already be counter-
acting, any de-policing occurring due to the “Ferguson effect.”  However, it is 
possible that de-policing is not the driving force behind the “Ferguson ef-
fect.” 
B.  Police-Worn Body Cameras and Lost Legitimacy 
What if the driving force behind the “Ferguson effect” and the rise in 
crime is not de-policing, but rather a lost trust in police in African-American 
communities that surfaces each time a controversial police use of force inci-
dent becomes public, particularly if it is documented in a citizen-recorded 
video?  Can police-worn body cameras have an impact on this version of the 
effect, again serving as an antidote?  A diverse collection of groups appears to 
believe that they can. 
In a recent survey of more than sixty police departments, the DOJ con-
cluded that cameras had the potential to promote “perceived legitimacy and 
sense of procedural justice” in officer-citizen encounters.77  Support for body 
cameras appears to be bipartisan78 and cross-racial.79  In 2014, President 
Obama  announced that he would seek to provide $263 million to buy body 
cameras for police departments and provide training in their use.80  In addi-
tion, at least thirty-six state legislatures and Congress have taken legislative 
action to purchase police-worn body cameras.81  In her groundbreaking order 
in the NYPD “stop and frisk” case, Judge Scheindlin wrote that police-worn 
body cameras “should . . . alleviate some of the mistrust that has developed 
 
 75. Barak Ariel et al., “Contagious Accountability”: A Global Multisite Ran-
domized Controlled Trial on the Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Citizens’ 
Complaints Against the Police, 44 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 293, 301 (2017). 
 76. Id. at 307. 
 77. Kirk Johnson, Today’s Police Put on a Gun and a Camera, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/us/todays-police-put-on-a-gun-
and-a-camera.html?_r=0 (internal quotations omitted); see also Chapter Four Con-
sidering Police Body Cameras, supra note 68, at 1803 (“That so many Americans feel 
they would be safer if all police officers wore body cameras speaks to this technolo-
gy’s potential to increase accountability and transparency.”). 
 78. Roseanna Sommers, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization?, 
125 YALE L.J. 1304, 1309 (2016) (noting that a Pew Research Center poll in Decem-
ber 2014 showed 79% of Republicans, 90% of Democrats, and 88% of Independents 
thought body cameras were a good idea). 
 79. Id. (the same poll shows support for body cameras by African-Americans 
(90%), Hispanics (89%), and Caucasians (85%)). 
 80. Chapter Four Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 68, at 1795–96. 
 81. Kampfe, supra note 66, at 1160. 
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between the police and the black and Hispanic communities.”82  Moreover, 
even the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), which initially opposed 
police-worn body cameras and scarcely agrees with the DOJ and police de-
partments on most issues, reversed itself and now supports their use.83 
This near unanimity of opinion appears to derive from what all these 
groups perceive as the most important benefits that body cameras can provide 
to a public distrustful of the police – transparency and accountability.84  Re-
search shows that as public perception of the police becomes more positive, 
citizens are more compliant, and thus the crime rate decreases.85  Increased 
transparency is central to the public’s perception of police legitimacy because 
it demonstrates fairness and justice.86  Police-worn body cameras contribute 
to a sense of fairness and justice when they assist in resolving what would 
otherwise be suspect officer-citizen encounters by creating an “objective and 
reviewable record.”87 
This is not to say, however, that police body cameras will serve as a 
magic bullet that will solve all disputes.88  In fact, a number of commentators 
have stressed that video evidence is not a panacea.89  To illustrate this point, 
Professor Dan Kahan conducted an empirical study using the dash cam video 
in the case of Scott v. Harris that eight members of the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 82. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see 
also Allyson Roy, Examining the Effects of Police Department Policy and Assign-
ment on Camera Use and Activation (May 2014) (unpublished Masters thesis, Arizo-
na State University) (on file with author). 
 83. Chapter Four Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 68, at 1796; 
Sommers, supra note 78, at 1310. 
 84. See Kampfe, supra note 66, at 1163. 
 85. See generally Roy, supra note 82. 
 86. WHITE, supra note 72, at 19. 
 87. Kampfe, supra note 66, at 1163. 
 88. One example of how police body cameras will not serve as a magic bullet 
because not everyone perceives a video recording the same way is the 1991 videotape 
showing the police beating of Rodney King.  Geoffrey Taylor Gibbs, Opinion, L.A. 
Cops, Taped in the Act, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1991/03/12/opinion/l-a-cops-taped-in-the-act.html.  The stark differences in the way 
in which the King video was viewed were illustrated most clearly by the riots that 
occurred after a state criminal prosecution of the officers involved in the beating re-
sulted in an acquittal by a largely white jury of three of the four officers and a mistrial 
as to the fourth.  Id. 
 89. Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 831, 833 (2015).  See also Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to 
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
837, 840 (2009); Sommers, supra note 78, at 1353–54; Alexandra Mateescu et al., 
Police Body-Worn Cameras 24 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
Data & Society Research Institute) (“[T]he idea that cameras are able to capture the 
full story should be taken with caution.”). 
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found to be unambiguous.90  Kahan’s researchers found that when they al-
lowed the video to “speak for itself” – as the Court encouraged readers of its 
opinion to do – they found that “what it says depends on to whom it is speak-
ing.”91  As Kahan observed: 
Whites and African Americans, high-wage earners and low-wage 
earners, Northeasterners and Southerners and Westerners, liberals and 
conservatives, Republicans and Democrats – all varied significantly in 
their perceptions of the risk that Harris posed, of the risk the police 
created by deciding to pursue him, and of the need to use deadly force 
against Harris in the interest of reducing public risk.92 
These significant differences suggested to Kahan the presence of value-
motivated cognition or the tendency of people to resolve factual ambiguities 
in a way that is consistent with their existing values.93  Such differences are 
no doubt a reality of American society.  If, as one commentator has noted, 
Officer Darren Wilson had been wearing a body camera when he shot Mi-
chael Brown, “opinions about what the video ‘showed’ almost certainly 
would split along political divisions about race, racial justice, police practic-
es, and concepts of law and order.”94  Such differences of opinion surface 
after events like a Staten Island grand jury’s recent decision not to indict Of-
ficer Daniel Pantaleo after the death of Eric Garner, despite a video recording 
of the encounter.95  The failure to indict led Garner’s father to tell reporters 
that the President’s body camera initiative was “[t]hrowing money away.  
Video didn’t matter here.”96 
The correct question, however, is not whether police body camera video 
will resolve all ambiguity, but whether having video from a police body cam-
era in a greater percentage of officer-citizen encounters is better than the sta-
tus quo.  Put simply, is having recorded video that is inherently less biased 
and more reliable than an eyewitness better in a system in which ambiguity is 
resolved largely by resorting to eyewitness testimony?  In some cases, what 
the video shows may be clear enough to all viewers that it is dispositive.  For 
instance, in a case where it directly exposes outright dishonesty, it will likely 
 
 90. Kahan et al., supra note 89, at 864; Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 
(2007) (civil suit against a deputy sheriff brought by a motorist who was left para-
lyzed when the car he was driving was rammed during a high-speed chase). 
 91. Kahan et al., supra note 89, at 838, 903 (Kahan’s researchers showed the 
dash cam video to a diverse sample of 1350 Americans). 
 92. Id. at 903. 
 93. Id. at 842–43. 
 94. Wasserman, supra note 89, at 841. 
 95. Sommers, supra note 78, at 1309. 
 96. Id. at 1309–10 (alteration in original) (quoting Eliott C. McLaughlin, After 
Eric Garner: What’s Point of Police Body Cameras?, CNN (Dec. 8, 2014, 7:41 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/04/us/eric-garner-ferguson-body-cameras-debate). 
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carry the day.97  To the extent that such use of body camera video exposes 
bad cops and leads to their departure from the ranks of the police, it is un-
questionably a good thing.98  In other cases, although all viewers may not 
always see it in the same way, it nonetheless provides the opportunity for 
people not physically present at the event to learn more about what happened 
than they would have without the video. 
IV.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST BODY CAMERAS 
While there may be strong arguments in favor of police body cameras, 
critics remain fairly consistent in their reasons to question, if not directly op-
pose, this policy.  Part A of this section discusses general concerns relating to 
potential violations of privacy rights associated with recording individuals 
without their consent.  This Part will discuss the competing interests between 
privacy rights and the public’s right to information, while offering potential 
suggestions for administering body cameras to find a proper balance.  Part B 
then delves into the specific federal and state laws that exist to protect our 
privacy, which include protection against video recordings.  This Part will 
further discuss issues regarding images and sounds from innocent bystanders 
and family members who are more likely to be captured with a police body 
camera than with dashboard cameras or street surveillance cameras.  Part C 
examines another common concern regarding prohibitive costs to police de-
partments by examining the expense for the equipment, storage, and training 
– as they are substantial – and whether this cost is justified by the potential 
benefits.  Part D discusses the potential over-deterrence that body cameras 
may cause.  This Part analyzes the effect constant recording can have on a 
police officer’s decisions, due to the possibility of later criticism and scrutiny.  
Part E then discusses the concern of over-reliance on technology in judging 
how an officer exercises discretion in the performance of his or her duties, 
exploring the idea that a picture is worth a thousand words, yet sometimes the 
narrative captured by an image is incomplete or false.  Part F explores the 
possibility that recorded images will be used for reasons unrelated to law 
enforcement.  This Part dives into whether releasing images to the public 
allows the police to lose control of the narrative, opening the door to an en-
tirely new set of concerns.  Finally, Part G considers the potential for police 
opposition to the use of body cameras by comparing the pushback for record-
 
 97. Id. at 1350 (even a commentator who is generally skeptical of video’s ability 
to outperform non-video evidence acknowledges that “video evidence may turn out to 
be decisive in cases where one party has blatantly lied about what happened”). 
 98. See, e.g., id. at 1313 (noting the video showed the police officer picking up 
the taser and placing it near the shooting victim’s body, and “once the video surfaced, 
‘there was hardly the typical closing of ranks around [the officer]’ by other police and 
he was quickly charged with murder” (quoting Adam Chandler, The Total Rejection 
of Michael Slager, ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/arc 
hive/2015/04/the-otherworldly-rejection-of-michael-slager/390165)). 
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ed interrogations to the introduction of body cameras to the law enforcement 
arsenal. 
A.  Protection of Privacy Rights Generally 
A major point of contention involving police body cameras relates to the 
privacy rights of innocent bystanders captured on the video, such as family 
members.99  If a police video becomes public domain, incidents caught on 
tape could be accessible to anyone, without the consent of those videotaped.  
While bystanders on the street or in a public square may not have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy, someone in a private home likely does not expect 
to be filmed.  Family members caught on film would be connected to the 
filmed incident by association to the video.  This connection could affect 
reputations, relationships, and present or future employment.  What are the 
rights of the innocent with this new technology under these privacy laws?  
Should the video that includes innocent bystanders and family members 
eventually be made available to the public?  Releasing a police video into the 
public domain also raises the question of whether or not a person gives up his 
or her reasonable expectation of privacy simply because he or she is suspect-
ed of committing a crime. 
The line between the public’s right to know and an individual’s reason-
able expectation of privacy has been difficult to define.  Some courts have 
ruled on the side of greater transparency, while others have been more defer-
ential to law enforcement’s posture toward privacy.100  The divide over priva-
cy has been most pronounced between groups such as the ACLU and state 
lawmakers.101  However, several ideas have been proposed to accommodate 
the interests of both sides.  One straightforward approach is to simply require 
officers who wear body cameras to notify, whenever practicable, the public 
that they are being recorded, or require officers to wear easily visible signage 
that the officer is wearing a body camera and recording conversations and 
activities.102 
The alternative is to require officers to operate their body cameras only 
when interacting with the public in an official capacity.  Not surprisingly, 
critics of the police are uncomfortable giving officers the power to turn a 
camera on and off and essentially decide what should or should not be cap-
 
 99. Chapter Four Considering Body Cameras, supra note 68, at 1808–09. 
 100. Eileen Sullivan, Police Body Cameras Show More Than Just the Facts, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 11, 2015, 12:14 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune. 
com/sdut-police-body-cameras-may-solve-one-problem-but-2015sep11-story.html. 
 101. Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, a 
Win for All, ACLU (Oct. 2013), https://www.aclu.org/police-body-mounted-cameras-
right-policies-place-win-all (last updated Mar. 2015); Ryan J. Foley, Bills Nationwide 
Aim to Seal Police Body Camera Videos, DES MOINES REGISTER (Mar. 20, 2015, 
11:10 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-and-courts/2015/03/ 
21/body-cameras-access-nationwide/25108067/. 
 102. See Stanley, supra note 101. 
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tured by a body camera.103  Even officers are wary of this approach, as they 
worry that the discretion to turn a body camera on and off will be used 
against them when there is a questionable incident that is not properly record-
ed because of a technical malfunction, an honest mistake on the part of the 
officer, or the circumstances did not give the officer the time to do so. 
Obviously, a policy that allows selective recording will have to include 
clear rules about when and how such recordings are to occur, as well as im-
pose serious punishment, in order to deter violations of the policy.104  At this 
time, it is hard to imagine a selective recording policy that will fully satisfy 
law enforcement, proponents of privacy, and critics suspicious of law en-
forcement. 
One challenge of having the body camera turned on during an entire 
shift and recording everything is that this would, of course, capture far more 
information than is relevant to police work – including private conversations 
and activities during breaks.  Police departments would need the resources 
and capacity to store, maintain, and protect this information, which could 
place a strain on already-tight budgets, as discussed later.105 
Additionally, departments in possession of such information would un-
doubtedly be burdened by numerous requests from the media and public for 
such information.  While much of the private or unofficial conversations and 
activities could be quickly deleted, this may run afoul of open records laws 
and be unpopular among those who rely on open records laws to obtain tanta-
lizing and embarrassing images.  Further, as there are websites dedicated to 
nothing but posting videos from police body cameras, quick deletion of such 
information may not even be sufficient to protect privacy rights against those 
wishing to publish tantalizing and embarrassing images on the Internet.106 
Under this proposal, departments would need the resources, technical 
capacity, and trained personnel to redact sensitive law enforcement and pri-
vate information when responding to an open records request.  By some esti-
mates, the costs of editing videos to protect privacy interests would over-
whelm some police departments.  Because of the privacy interests implicated 
by this type of policy, legislators and regulators may want to consider limit-
ing the amount of time the non-public or non-law enforcement related infor-
mation must be preserved and turned over in an open records request.  Some 
state lawmakers believe this approach is unworkable and are considering an 
outright ban to public release, except to those individuals whose images are 
captured on video.107 
 
 103. Fox8Live.com Staff, Officer Involved in Monday Shooting Had Body Cam 
Turned Off, FOX 8 LIVE (2014), http://www.fox8live.com/story/26283883/officer-
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 105. See id. 
 106. See Police Body Cameras: Pros and Cons, NEW ENG. C., http://www.new 
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cons/#.WBPcOJMrJp8 (last visited Mar. 12, 2017). 
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Any responsible policy regarding the release of a police video should re-
flect an appropriate balance between respecting the public’s right to know the 
actions of its public servants, preserving legitimate privacy rights, and pro-
tecting the integrity of law enforcement investigations and prosecutions.  
Once justice under the law has been served and appropriate steps taken to 
protect legitimate privacy concerns, then an underlying police video should 
be released.  The only exception to this policy might be those extraordinary 
circumstances where releasing the video incites mass violence, where images 
of graphic nudity cannot be blurred, or where the images of a body are so 
disturbing that a family has asked that it be withheld out of respect for a de-
ceased. 
However, these should be extraordinary exceptions.  We live in an open 
society where access to information – no matter how graphic, distasteful, or 
unsavory – is valued, and in most cases, citizens have a right to know how 
their tax dollars are spent and how public servants perform their jobs.  Fur-
thermore, subject to legitimate law enforcement needs, the media enjoys the 
greatest protection under the First Amendment of our Constitution to report 
on the actions of our government.108  If the media chooses to air those violent, 
distasteful, or unsavory videos, citizens who do not wish to be subjected to 
those images have the ability to avert their eyes, while those wishing to watch 
may also do so.  Airing these videos may be the most effective way to edu-
cate the public and to hold accountable those responsible for wrongdoing and 
errors in judgment. 
We must accept that releasing the video of a police shooting may result 
in condemnation, calls for resignations, and protests.  That is the legitimate 
right – some would argue the responsibility – of every citizen, provided such 
protests are peaceful.  No video gives a person a license to riot, destroy prop-
erty, loot stores, burn police cars, or to otherwise break the law. 
B.  Statutory Protection of Privacy Rights 
Our concern over the possible invasion of privacy is reflected in existing 
laws at the federal and state levels governing police recordings.  The first Part 
of this section will discuss the protections created by federal statutes – the 
majority of which stem from Title III of the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act.  The second Part will turn to the state statutory protections, while 
discussing the difference in protections depending on the particular state. 
1.  Privacy Protection at the Federal Level 
As the technology of recording devices has progressed, Congress has 
continuously enacted and modified statutory privacy protections.  The statu-
tory provisions that encompass the vast majority of federal privacy protec-
 
 108. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
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tions in regards to electronic recordings can be found in Title III of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act.109 
Title III prohibits wiretapping and other forms of electronic eavesdrop-
ping, possession of wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping equipment, use 
or disclosure of information obtained through illegal wiretapping or electron-
ic eavesdropping, and disclosure of information secured through court-
ordered wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping.110  Title III’s prohibition 
against illegal wiretapping applies to any employee or agent of the United 
States111 and prohibits any person from intentionally intercepting or endeav-
oring to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications by using an elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other device.112  However, the federal privacy protec-
tions created by Title III are far from absolute. 
Under Title III, there are numerous exemptions from the general prohi-
bition on illegal wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping.  Some of these 
exemptions include consent interceptions, publicly accessible radio commu-
nications, government officials, communication service providers, and certain 
domestic situations.113  One carve-out of the federal privacy protection – per-
haps the largest – is found in the consent interceptions exemption.114  Under 
this exemption, wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are lawful if at 
least one party to the conversation has given explicit or implicit consent to the 
recording.115  This exemption extends to the use of police body cameras, pro-
vided that one party to the conversation consents to the recording.116  A po-
lice officer wearing a body camera has obviously consented to the recording 
of the encounter.  Thus, any recordings made involving that officer will be 
covered under the consent exemption.  It is important to note, however, that 
satisfying the one-party consent exemption of federal law will not be suffi-
cient to make a recording lawful in states that require all parties involved to 
consent.  Federal statutory privacy protections are often considered the bare 
minimum required by the Constitution, causing many to look to individual 
state privacy protections for greater protections. 
2.  Privacy Protection at the State Level 
Virtually all states have laws making it unlawful to record the private 
conversations of others without consent.117  In most states, recording is al-
 
 109. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–21, 
2701–10, 3121–26 (West 2017). 
 110. Id. § 2701. 
 111. Id. § 2510(6). 
 112. Id. § 2511(1). 
 113. Id. §§ 2511(2)(b)–(g). 
 114. Id. § 2511(2)(c). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. §§ 2511(2)(c)–(d). 
 117. See infra APPENDIX A. 
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lowed if a party to the communication gives prior consent.118  However, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington make it un-
lawful to record without first obtaining the consent of all persons engaged in 
the recorded conversation.119  Some states, such as Florida and Montana, 
carve out an exception for law enforcement recordings in the line of duty.120 
The right of privacy is important, but it must be balanced against legiti-
mate law enforcement needs.  This can be accomplished by creating an ex-
ception in the law for recordings by law enforcement in the line of duty.  For 
example, under Florida law, all parties to a communication must give prior 
consent for the interception of any oral communications to be lawful.121  
However, an exception exists specifically for law enforcement.122  This ex-
ception still requires the prior consent of at least one party to the communica-
tion but only applies when the purpose of the interception is to obtain evi-
dence of a criminal act.123  Thus, the exception protects general privacy rights 
while allowing for law enforcement to better do their job. 
C.  Costs 
Technology such as body cameras costs money, and many smaller or ru-
ral jurisdictions simply do not have the resources to equip their police de-
partments with body cameras.124  The costs of deploying police body cameras 
will likely include not only the costs of the cameras, but also ancillary 
equipment, training in the use of the equipment, protection and storage of the 
video, administrative and legal costs – including responding to open records 
requests – and other costs related to data storage, management, and disclosure 
to the public, as discussed below.  There are several million dollars in grants 
for body cameras available from the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services within the DOJ.125  Additionally, the DOJ recently announced that it 
has allocated $20 million to police departments wishing to introduce body 
cameras to their officers as part of its Body-Worn Camera Program.126  Ad-
vances in technology are likely to result in greater acceptance of body camer-
 
 118. See infra APPENDIX A. 
 119. See infra APPENDIX A. 
 120. See infra APPENDIX A; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(3)(c) (West 2017); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-223(3) (West 2017). 
 121. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(2)(d). 
 122. Id. § 934.03(2)(c). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Chapter Four Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 68, at 1809–10. 
 125. Ryan J. Reilly, Obama Administration Gives Police Departments Millions 
for Body Cams, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2015, 12:23 PM), http://www.huff 
ingtonpost.com/entry/police-body-camera-grants_us_56001b4be4b08820d919532b. 
 126. Christina Beck, Justice Department Allocates $20 million for Body Cameras, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/ 
2016/0927/Justice-Department-allocates-20-million-for-body-cameras. 
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as, make them simpler to use, and cause training and protocol to become 
streamlined.  However, even if advances in this technology result in lower 
costs, substantially more resources are needed if body cameras are to be re-
quired for entire law enforcement departments. 
While the overall costs of body cameras are not insubstantial, particular-
ly to small, rural police departments, advocates of body cameras insist that 
over time much of the additional expense will be offset by fewer civil suits 
against police for misconduct, less administrative time for a department in-
vestigating a police shooting, and fewer man-hours taken off the streets and 
dedicated to desk duty or participating in a trial following accusations of a 
bad shooting.127  In theory, this sounds reasonable, but critics argue that any 
lost savings from body cameras are likely to be casualties in the annual diffi-
cult decision-making over choices for a shrinking law enforcement budget.  
Although such savings may be difficult to quantify, supporters counter they 
are nevertheless real and should not be ignored.128 
D.  Over-Deterrence 
Studies show that people act differently when they know they are being 
recorded.129  This is even true for public officials, such as judges and prosecu-
tors, and it explains why some oppose allowing cameras in the courtroom.130  
While body cameras do not record every activity of an officer, they do record 
statements and commands made by the officer, the reactions of others to the 
officer, and the view from the officer’s line of sight. 
A police officer on patrol has great discretion in enforcing the law.  De-
pending on the circumstances, an officer may issue a ticket, make an arrest, or 
give a warning and decline to issue a citation when an infraction or crime has 
occurred.  Good police work is often a function of information provided by 
people in the community.  Relationships will develop based on how the law is 
enforced and discretion is exercised.  Because police body cameras record the 
movements and decisions of police officers, law enforcement will be under-
standably concerned with how they will be judged by their superiors.  An 
officer under constant scrutiny is more likely to insist on strict adherence to 
the law for fear of being second-guessed by superiors.  This may adversely 
affect relationships with locals, which, in turn, makes fighting crime more 
challenging. 
 
 127. Chapter Four Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 68, at 1809. 
 128. Id. at 1809–10. 
 129. This is referred to in behavioral science as the Hawthorne effect and became 
a term following an experiment at the Hawthorne plant of Western Electric Company 
in the 1920s.  See generally RICHARD GILLESPIE, MANUFACTURING KNOWLEDGE: A 
HISTORY OF THE HAWTHORNE EXPERIMENTS (1991).  While the original experiment 
was discredited, the general premise has been accepted.  Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, Shed-
ding Light on the Hawthorne Studies, 6 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEH. 111, 125 (1985). 
 130. Bill Delmore, Cameras in the Courtroom: Limited Access Only, 67 TEX. B.J. 
782, 784–85 (2004). 
320 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
Thus, some critics argue body cameras may actually hinder good police 
work by making it more difficult to promote trust and good will in the com-
munity and to establish community partners.131  A confidential informant may 
be unwilling to cooperate and speak with law enforcement officials on cam-
era, no matter what assurances the department gives that the video of the in-
terview and the identity of the informant will be protected.  Similarly, a vic-
tim of domestic violence may be too frightened to talk on camera about the 
victim’s abuser for fear that the abuser may gain access to, or learn about, the 
interview and harm the victim again.  Thus, while body cameras may help 
police officers, overreliance on this technology, as discussed below, may 
actually harm police performance. 
E.  Overreliance on Technology 
When being evaluated for improper conduct, few police officers are 
willing to rely solely on a video recording.  First, while a body camera may 
indeed capture people, events, and surroundings, there is no guarantee the 
officer actually absorbed everything captured on film.132  The officer may 
have been focused on one particular movement or been distracted and turned 
his eyes from the scene captured by the body camera.  Second, a recording 
can never truly be comprehensive – it may fail to show relevant events or 
conditions outside the coverage of the lens that may have influenced an of-
ficer’s decision.  For example, a video cannot accurately capture the tension 
or energy of a situation and is incapable of showing tiny changes of facial 
expressions or body shifts that a trained officer recognizes as a precursor to 
violence.133  Third, enhancing the images of an incident and reviewing them 
in slow motion – all after the fact – may not reflect the officer’s experience or 
apprehensions in real time.134 
Context is critical.  As previously discussed, court determinations made 
involving allegations of excessive force are judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, causing the intent and mindset of the officer 
and his or her subjective understanding of the threat to remain very important 
in assessing responsibility.135  Nevertheless, even critics of body cameras 
must concede that the circumstances of a situation are less likely to be the 
subject of debate and second-guessing if there is video of the incident cap-
tured by a police body camera. 
 
 131. Kami Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras: A Primer on Police 
Accountability vs. Privacy, 58 HOW. L.J. 881, 888–89 (2015). 
 132. See Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil 
Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 620 (2009). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Chapter Four Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 68, at 1812–13. 
 135. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).  See also Kampfe, supra note 
66, at 1153 n.77. 
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F.  Loss of Control 
Another challenge to the growing popularity of body cameras is the loss 
of control over the video of a police shooting.  A video released by a by-
stander may actually hurt the future prosecution of a police officer for unlaw-
ful conduct, or it may present a picture at odds with the total facts.  One 
source of the bitter controversy in Chicago over the shooting of Laquan 
McDonald was whether a video from a police-worn body camera should be 
released to the public and if so, when.136  Those in favor of doing so argued 
that body cameras are purchased with taxpayer dollars, and therefore, as tax-
payers, the public is entitled to know how this technology is being used.137 
Unless the police are aware in advance of the existence of a private vid-
eo, they have no control over whether and when such a video is released to 
the public.  For this reason, if a video of an incident is to be made available to 
the public, the police would prefer that it be a video recorded by law en-
forcement, released at a time that does not frustrate law enforcement objec-
tives, and that gives the police an opportunity to be prepared to answer ques-
tions from the media and the public about the events captured on the video. 
On one hand, releasing a police video to the public immediately shifts 
the judgment of wrongdoing – at least initially – out of the hands of officials, 
such as prosecutors and judges, sworn to discharge a public duty, and into the 
hands of a potentially angry public.138  The power to judge incriminating im-
ages is transferred from established judicial systems with constitutional pro-
tections to an emotional public whose judgment may be affected by inflam-
matory images and preexisting bias.  Additionally, public outrage and mob 
mentality in response to a publicly available video can potentially influence 
the decisions of senior officials in subsequent disciplinary actions against 
officers and sway jury opinion in subsequent litigation.  In summary, there is 
serious concern over releasing a video of a controversial police shooting be-
 
 136. Lingering Questions in the Shooting of Laquan McDonald by Chicago Po-
lice, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/04/us/ 
questions-in-laquan-mcdonald-shooting.html. 
 137. For example, Indiana legislators are considering the expense to taxpayers, as 
well as privacy concerns, in drafting legislation regarding the release of police video.  
Matt Smith, Indiana Lawmakers Debate Whether to Restrict Access to Police Body 
Camera Video, FOX59 (Aug. 26, 2015, 4:38 PM), http://fox59.com/2015/08/26/ 
Indiana-lawmakers-debate-whether-to-restrict-access-to-police-body-camera-video/ 
(last updated Aug. 26, 2015, 5:11 PM). 
 138. The City of Chicago delayed the release of the video showing Ronald John-
son’s death for over a year, arguing that release of the video “could inflame the public 
and jeopardize the officer’s right to a fair trial if he was charged later.”  Jason Meis-
ner & Matthew Walberg, City Wavering on Keeping Video Secret in Another Fatal 
Chicago Police Shooting, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 2, 2015, 7:15 AM), http://www.chicago 
tribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-ronald-johnson-chicago-police-shooting-met-
20151201-story.html. 
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fore there has been an official government determination that the shooting is 
or is not justified. 
On the other hand, not making a body camera video publicly available – 
at least within a reasonable period of time following an incident – could lead 
to accusations of a cover-up of police brutality and misconduct by law en-
forcement and other public officials.  Critics alleged this occurred in Chicago 
after a year-long delay by officials in releasing the police videos showing the 
killing of Laquan McDonald and the actions just prior to the killing of Ronald 
Johnson.139  Claims of cover-up may also be raised if the public believes the 
video has been tampered with or altered.  This complication can be seen in 
the situation that infuriated the Chicago community, where some of the pub-
lic believed that the videos had been edited to shed a more favorable light on 
the officers involved.140 
In line with the concerns of police cover-ups, there are also concerns re-
garding whether an officer should be permitted to review the video prior to 
making a statement.  Memories can often be clouded from the stress and 
pressure that accompany any shooting.  Being able to see a video may jog the 
officer’s memory about the officer’s assessment of the situation and the rea-
sons for the officer’s actions.  By viewing the video first, it is more likely that 
the officer’s formal statement of the incident will be accurate and complete.  
However, there appears to be no consensus at this time among legal scholars, 
prosecutors, law enforcement, or civil libertarians on whether officers should 
view an existing video before giving a formal statement.141 
In addition to public concerns of police cover-ups, choosing not to re-
lease the video immediately after the incident can create a one-sided story of 
the events that took place.  Especially in situations where there is one or more 
citizen-recorded videos, the public will make snap judgments about the of-
ficer’s guilt or innocence based solely on videos that are likely only the final 
frame of the incident – rather than the entire incident – that fail to show the 
officer’s perspective.  While a court of law ultimately decides the officer’s 
fate, the court of public opinion can be extremely persuasive and lead to dire 
 
 139. Aamer Madhani, Hundreds Protest as Chicago Releases Video of Cop Shoot-
ing Teen 16 Times, USA TODAY (Nov. 24, 2015, 11:12 AM), http://www.usa 
today.com/story/news/2015/11/24/chicago-cop-charged-shooting-black-teen-16-times 
/76303768/ (last updated Nov. 25, 2015, 7:24 AM). 
 140. Associated Press, Burger King Manager Says Chicago Police Erased Sur-
veillance Video of Deadly Shooting, Q13 FOX (Nov. 28, 2015, 11:35 AM), http:// 
q13fox.com/2015/11/28/burger-king-manager-says-chicago-police-erased-
surveillance-video-of-deadly-shooting/. 
 141. The Police Executive Research Forum suggests that police officers view 
video before giving a statement.  MILLER ET AL., supra note 71, at 29.  In contrast, the 
ACLU argues that this practice “enables lying” and is a “poor investigative practice.”  
Jay Stanley & Peter Bibring, Should Officers Be Permitted to View Body Camera 
Footage Before Writing Their Reports?, ACLU (Jan. 13, 2015, 12:15 PM), https:// 
www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/should-officers-be-permitted-view-body-camera-foot 
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consequences for the officer and the police department.  For example, in the 
2016 shooting of Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, citizen bystand-
ers used their cell phones to record video footage of the final frames of the 
incident.142  This video footage spread like wildfire on social media and 
reached extensive amounts of viewers, allowing each of them to make a deci-
sion on whether the officers on the scene were justified in shooting Ster-
ling.143  While Sterling was only one of a number of people shot by police in 
2016, his death and the court of public opinion’s guilty verdict of the officers 
have led to numerous protests in cities nationwide.144  Regardless of whether 
the court of public opinion has the final word on an officer’s guilt, perception 
is an extremely important aspect of policing.  Releasing body camera video 
soon after an incident – especially incidents with citizen-recorded videos – 
could potentially help even the scales and present the public with a more neu-
tral view of the events leading to the incident, preventing public outcry and 
protests. 
There may, of course, be legitimate federal and state law enforcement 
reasons to deny or delay public access to a video.  Because the video may 
serve as the central piece of evidence in prosecuting a crime, allowing inves-
tigators and prosecutors sufficient time to study a video for investigative pur-
poses and to methodically develop a case without the intense public pressure 
to indict and pursue a conviction can help facilitate justice. 
However, there are measures that can be taken to reassure the public that 
the decision not to release a video shortly after an incident is based on legiti-
mate law enforcement reasons.  For example, the participation and support of 
a neutral party or group from outside the law enforcement community could 
reassure the public there is no attempted cover-up when there is a decision 
not to release a video to the public. 
G.  Police Opposition? 
As a general rule, the police – both individual officers and police organ-
izations – tend to resist any new technology.145  As video technology ad-
vanced in the 1980s and 1990s, such that the recording of suspect interviews 
became feasible, some departments began recording interviews, but many 
resisted.  The most notable resistance to recording interrogations came from 
the FBI, which did not allow its agents to video or audio record such inter-
 
 142. Joshua Berlinger, Nick Valencia & Steve Almasy, Alton Sterling Shooting: 
Homeless Man Made 911 Call, Source Says, CNN (July 8, 2016, 7:24 AM), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/us/baton-rouge-alton-sterling-shooting/. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Victor Morton, Dallas: Snipers Kill 5 Officers in Deadliest Day for Law 
Enforcement Since 9/11, WASH. TIMES (July 7, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes. 
com/news/2016/jul/7/black-lives-matter-protests-alton-sterling-philand/. 
 145. Roy, supra note 82, at 40. 
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views absent the permission of a high-ranking supervisor.146  Among the rea-
sons that the FBI cited to justify its policy were concerns that recording might 
inhibit cooperation, that the video might show methods that could appear 
unfair to some observers, and that logistical costs were significant.147 
Over time, however, the prevailing opinion among police officers and 
departments on this particular use of technology changed.  A telephone sur-
vey of more than 600 police departments conducted between 2003 and 2008 
found that “[n]one of the officers who had experience with electronic record-
ings would voluntarily return to reliance on handwritten notes . . . and efforts 
at reconstructing through later testimony what occurred during the interviews.  
Many expressed surprise that there are departments not making use of mod-
ern recording technology.”148  The benefits cited by departments that record-
ed included protection against baseless charges of improper conduct, fewer 
motions to suppress statements, more guilty pleas and guilty verdicts, deter-
rence of police misconduct, and increased public trust due to police transpar-
ency.149  As final evidence of the seismic shift on this particular use of tech-
nology, the FBI announced in May of 2014 that it would reverse its policy 
and not only allow, but require, the videotaping of interviews in most in-
stances.150  According to Attorney General Eric Holder, the change was made 
because creating an electronic record of the interrogation ensures that there is 
an objective account of the interview and a “clear and indisputable record[]” 
of what was said.151 
Similarly, in the current debate over police-worn body cameras, there is 
considerable resistance among some police organizations and officers.  In a 
study of camera use in the Mesa Arizona Police Department, a survey of in-
dividual officers found that only 23% thought that the department should 
adopt the system, and fewer than half believed that other officers would wel-
 
 146. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF 
CONFESSIONS AND WITNESS INTERVIEWS (Mar. 23, 2006) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC 
RECORDING OF CONFESSIONS AND WITNESS INTERVIEWS], http://www.nytimes.com 
/packages/pdf/national/20070402_FBI_Memo.pdf.  The FBI policy of not recording 
interviews was widely criticized by federal prosecutors.  See Donald Q. Cochran, 
Ghosts of Alabama: The Prosecution of Bobby Frank Cherry for the Bombing of the 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 18 n.118 (2006) (“FBI 
agents normally do not record, whether via audiotape, videotape, or signed statement, 
the statements of witnesses or suspects, instead relying (often to the dismay of genera-
tions of prosecutors) on an agent’s paraphrasing of what the witness said on a[n] FBI 
Form ‘FD-302.’”). 
 147. See Cochran, supra note 146, at 1, 3. 
 148. Thomas P. Sullivan, Andrew W. Vail & Howard W. Anderson III, The Case 
for Recording Police Interrogations, 34 LITIG. 1, 4 (2008). 
 149. Id. at 34–35. 
 150. Michael S. Schmidt, In Policy Change, Justice Dept. to Require Recording of 
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/ 
us/politics/justice-dept-to-reverse-ban-on-recording-interrogations.html. 
 151. Id. 
2017] POLICE-WORN BODY CAMERAS 325 
come the presence of a camera at a scene.152  In a study of the Phoenix Police 
Department, most officers’ attitudes were either ambivalent or negative re-
garding cameras.153  In an initial survey of more than 200 LAPD officers 
conducted in August of 2015, approximately two-thirds thought the cameras 
would be a distraction, half thought they would be an invasion of their priva-
cy, and fewer than 10% thought they would reduce the amount of time spent 
on paperwork.154  Finally, in the NYPD “stop and frisk” case, both the NYPD 
leadership and the police union voiced opposition to a judge’s order requiring 
officers to wear body cameras.155 
However, there is reason to believe that police attitudes – both individu-
al and departmental – toward body cameras will evolve over time and become 
more positive.  Many of the arguments made in opposition to the use of body 
cameras – that they might inhibit cooperation, show police actions that could 
appear unfair to some observers, and increase logistical costs – are the same 
ones that were made against recording interrogations.156  Only after officers 
began videotaping interrogations were they able to see and appreciate that the 
benefits of a video record – such as protection against baseless improper con-
duct charges, more guilty pleas and verdicts, less police misconduct, and in-
creased public trust due to more transparency – outweighed any costs to such 
a degree that most officers cannot imagine going back to the old method. 
In fact, we are already starting to see that officers appreciate body cam-
eras more as they use them.  For instance, in the Phoenix study mentioned 
above, officers’ attitudes toward the cameras improved significantly after 
wearing them for three months.157  Both individual officers and departments 
have begun to embrace cameras because they offer “an exceptional layer of 
protection to the majority of officers who perform their duties in an appropri-
ate manner.”158  Police officers come to think of their camera as “another 
level of protection, a kind of flak jacket of evidence about what happened.”159  
As one officer explained: “I get nervous when I think it’s not on . . . . I know 
it’s going to document what the truth is, and I want the truth out there.”160 
 
 152. WHITE, supra note 72, at 21 n.10. 
 153. Id. at 21. 
 154. Craig Uchida, President, Justice & Security Strategies, Inc., Body-Worn 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A fair-minded look at the data relating to the incidence of violent crime 
since the events of August 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri, and other similar 
incidents – perhaps most significantly the Brennan Center’s recent projection 
that there is likely to be a post-Ferguson increase of greater than 30% in the 
national murder rate by the end of 2016 – leads to the conclusion that some-
thing is going on here.  An increase in the murder rate of this magnitude hap-
pens for a reason, and it appears that the most likely reason for this increase is 
some type of “Ferguson effect.”  Whether as a result of de-policing or the lost 
legitimacy of police in African-American communities, an increase of this 
magnitude threatens to undo much of the hard work done in the past twenty 
years by law enforcement and the American people to reduce crime. 
The increased use of police-worn body cameras undoubtedly creates is-
sues that need to be resolved.  There are legitimate privacy concerns, both in 
terms of the initial recording, as well as questions relating to the storage and 
release of the recordings, concerns about the cost of widespread use of body 
cameras, and questions relating to how such recordings will affect po-
lice/citizen interactions.  None of these concerns, however, appear to be in-
surmountable.  Moreover, none appear to eclipse the benefits that the in-
creased use of body cameras by police on the street could have.  Whatever the 
reasons for the current rise in crime, increased use of body cameras worn by 
police officers appears to have the potential to reverse this disturbing trend by 
providing police officers with an incentive to get out of their patrol cars and 
restoring legitimacy to police in their interactions with citizens. 
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APPENDIX A: STATE LAWS REGARDING RECORDING PRIVATE 
CONVERSATIONS OF OTHERS 
 
 Consent Brief Summary 
Federal161 One Party 
Unlawful to intentionally intercept 
wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tions by using an electronic, mechani-
cal, or other device without the con-
sent of at least one person engaged in 
the conversation. 
Alabama162 One Party 
Unlawful to record any part of the 
private communication of others with-
out the consent of at least one person 
engaged in the conversation. 
Alaska163 One Party 
A person may not use an eavesdrop-
ping device to hear or record any part 
of an oral conversation without the 
consent of one party to the conversa-
tion.  “Eavesdropping device” means 
any device capable of being used to 
hear or record oral conversation, 
whether the conversation is conducted 
in person or by other means. 
Arizona164 One Party 
Unlawful to intentionally intercept a 
conversation at which a person is not 
present without the consent of a party 
to such conversation or discussion. 
Arkansas165 One Party 
It is unlawful for a person to intercept 
an oral communication and to record 
or possess a recording of the commu-
nication unless the person is a party to 
the communication or one of the par-
ties to the communication has given 
prior consent to the interception and 
recording. 
 
 
 161. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–21 (West 2017). 
 162. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-30(1), 13A-11-31 (2017). 
 163. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 42.20.310(a)(1) (West 2017). 
 164. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3001(7), (8), 13-3005(A)(2), 13-3012(9) 
(2017). 
 165. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120(a) (West 2017). 
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California166 All Parties 
Unlawful for any person to intention-
ally and without the consent of all 
parties to a confidential communica-
tion, by means of any electronic am-
plifying or recording device, eaves-
drop upon or record the confidential 
communication. 
Colorado167 One Party 
Any person not visibly present during 
a conversation or discussion commits 
eavesdropping if he knowingly over-
hears or records such conversation or 
discussion without the consent of at 
least one of the principal parties there-
to, or attempts to do so. 
Connecticut168 One Party 
Unlawful to eavesdrop.  “Eavesdrop-
ping” is intentionally overhearing or 
recording a conversation or discussion, 
without the consent of at least one 
party thereto, by a person not present 
thereat, by means of any instrument, 
device, or equipment. 
Delaware169 One Party 
Lawful for a person to intercept an 
oral communication where the person 
is a party to the communication or 
where one of the parties to the com-
munication has given prior consent to 
the interception, unless the intercep-
tion is for criminal or tortious acts. 
District of Co-
lumbia170 One Party 
Unlawful for a person not acting under 
color of law, not a party to the conver-
sation, or without prior consent from a 
party to the conversation to willfully 
intercept or endeavor to intercept any 
oral communication. 
 
  
 
 166. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 2017). 
 167. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-304 (West 2017). 
 168. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-187, 53a-189 (West 2017). 
 169. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1335(a)(4), 2402(c)(4) (West 2017). 
 170. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-542(b)(3) (West 2017). 
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Florida171 
All Parties 
(different 
rules for 
police in 
certain situa-
tions, see § 
934.03(3)(c)) 
Unlawful to intentionally intercept or 
endeavor to intercept any oral com-
munications, except when all parties to 
the communication have given prior 
consent to the interception. 
Georgia172 All Persons Observed 
Unlawful for any person, through the 
use of any device, without the consent 
of all persons observed, to observe or 
record the activities of another that 
occur in any private place and out of 
public view. 
Hawaii173 One Person 
Unlawful to intentionally intercept or 
attempt to intercept any oral commu-
nication.  Not unlawful for person not 
acting under color of law to intercept 
an oral communication when the per-
son is a party to the communication or 
when one of the parties to the commu-
nication has given prior consent. 
Idaho174 One Person 
Unlawful to intercept any oral com-
munication unless prior consent has 
been given by one of the parties to the 
communication. 
Illinois175 All Parties 
Unlawful to knowingly or intentional-
ly use an eavesdropping device in a 
surreptitious manner for the purpose of 
recording all or any part of any private 
conversation without consent of all 
parties. 
Indiana176 One Party 
Only deals with electronic communi-
cations; oral communications are not 
covered. 
Iowa177 One Party 
Unlawful to willfully intercept or en-
deavor to intercept an oral communi-
cation without consent from one of the 
parties to the communication. 
 
 171. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(3)(d) (West 2017). 
 172. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2) (West 2017). 
 173. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 803-42 (West 2017). 
 174. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6702(2)(d) (West 2017). 
 175. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2(a) (West 2017). 
 176. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-31.5-2-176 (West 2017). 
 177. IOWA CODE ANN. § 808B.2(2)(c) (West 2017). 
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Kansas178 One Party 
Breach of privacy in Kansas deals with 
private communications (phone, tele-
graph, etc.) or installing recording 
devices in private locations.  Both 
require consent of one of the parties 
involved. 
Kentucky179 One Party 
A person is guilty of eavesdropping 
when he intentionally uses any device 
to eavesdrop, whether or not he is 
present at the time.  “Eavesdrop” 
means to overhear or record any part 
of an oral communication of others 
without the consent of at least one of 
the parties. 
Louisiana180 One Party 
Unlawful to willfully intercept or en-
deavor to intercept any oral communi-
cation.  It is not unlawful if a person 
intercepting a communication is a 
party to the communication or if one 
of the parties to the communication 
gives prior consent, unless interception 
is for a criminal or tortious act. 
Maine181 One Party 
Unlawful for any person to intention-
ally or knowingly intercept or attempt 
to intercept any oral communication 
(but see law officer exception).  “In-
tercept” is defined as hearing or re-
cording the contents of any oral com-
munication by any person other than 
the sender or receiver or a person who 
has given prior consent. 
 
  
 
 178. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-6101(a)(1), (a)(4) (2016). 
 179. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.010, 526.020 (West 2017). 
 180. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1303(a)(1), (c)(4) (2017). 
 181. ME. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 709(4), 710(1) (2017). 
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Maryland182 All Parties 
Unlawful for any person to willfully 
intercept or endeavor to intercept any 
oral communication.  Lawful for a 
person to intercept an oral communi-
cation where the person is a party to 
the communication and where all of 
the parties to the communication have 
given prior consent to the interception, 
except in the case of tortious or crimi-
nal activities. 
Massachusetts183 All Parties 
Unlawful to willfully commit or at-
tempt to commit an interception of any 
oral communication.  “Interception” 
refers to secretly hearing or recording 
the contents of any oral communica-
tion through the use of an intercepting 
device by a person who does not have 
prior authorization from all parties. 
Michigan184 All Parties 
Unlawful for any person who is pre-
sent or who is not present during a 
private conversation to willfully use 
any device to eavesdrop upon the pri-
vate conversation without the consent 
of all parties thereto. 
Minnesota185 One Party 
Unlawful for any person to intention-
ally intercept or attempt to intercept 
any oral communication.  Not unlaw-
ful for a person not acting under color 
of law to intercept an oral communica-
tion where such person is a party to the 
communication or where one of the 
parties to the communication has giv-
en prior consent. 
 
 
 182. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (West 2017). 
 183. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 99(b)(4), (c)(1) (West 2017). 
 184. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539c (West 2017). 
 185. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.02a(d) (West 2017). 
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Mississippi186 One Party 
Not unlawful for a person not acting 
under color of law to intercept a wire, 
oral, or other communication if the 
person is a party to the communication 
or if one of the parties to the commu-
nication has given prior consent to the 
interception, unless the communica-
tion is intercepted for the purpose of 
committing any criminal or tortious 
acts. 
Missouri187 One Party 
Not unlawful for a person acting under 
law to intercept an oral communica-
tion, where such person is a party to 
the communication or where one of 
the parties to the communication has 
given prior consent to such intercep-
tion. 
Montana188 All Parties 
Only deals with electronic communi-
cations; oral communications are not 
covered.  Guilty if purposely intercepts 
an electronic communication, unless 
done by a public official or employee 
in performance of official duties. 
Nebraska189 One Party 
Not unlawful for a person not acting 
under color of law to intercept an oral 
communication when such person is a 
party to the communication or has 
prior permission from one of the par-
ties.  Excludes interception for tortious 
or criminal acts. 
Nevada190 One Party 
Cannot surreptitiously record or at-
tempt to record any private conversa-
tion engaged in by another person or 
disclose contents of communication 
unless authorized to do so by one of 
the persons engaging in the conversa-
tion. 
 
 186. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-531 (West 2017). 
 187. MO. ANN. STAT. § 542.402.1(2) (West 2017). 
 188. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(2) (West 2017). 
 189. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-290(2)(c) (West 2017). 
 190. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.650 (West 2017). 
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New 
Hampshire191 All Parties 
Unlawful to willfully intercept any 
oral communication without consent 
of all parties. 
New Jersey192 One Party 
Unlawful to purposefully intercept or 
attempt to intercept any oral commu-
nication unless they are a party to the 
conversation or have prior consent 
from one of the parties to the conver-
sation. 
New Mexico193 One Party 
The reading, interrupting, taking, or 
copying of any message, communica-
tion, or report by telegraph or tele-
phone is unlawful without the consent 
of one of the parties. 
New York194 One Party 
Eavesdropping consists of unlawfully 
engaging in mechanical overhearing of 
a conversation.  “Mechanical over-
hearing” means the intentional over-
hearing or recording of a conversation 
without the consent of at least one 
party by means of any instrument, 
device, or equipment. 
North Carolina195 One Party 
Unlawful to willfully intercept or at-
tempt to intercept any oral communi-
cation without consent of at least one 
party to the communication. 
North Dakota196 One Party 
Unlawful to intentionally intercept any 
wire or oral communication by use of 
any electronic, mechanical, or other 
device, unless the individual was a 
party to the communication or one of 
the parties to the communication gave 
prior consent to such interception. 
 
 191. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2017). 
 192. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-3, 2A:156A-4 (West 2017). 
 193. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1(C) (West 2017). 
 194. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 250.00(2), 250.05 (McKinney 2017). 
 195. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-287(a) (West 2017). 
 196. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-02 (West 2017). 
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Ohio197 One Party 
Unlawful to intercept or attempt to 
intercept an oral communication.  
Does not apply to a person who is a 
party to the communication or if one 
of the parties to the communication 
has given prior consent to the intercep-
tion, although this exception is invalid 
if for tortious or criminal conduct. 
Oklahoma198 One Party 
Not unlawful for a person not acting 
under color of law to intercept an oral 
communication when such person is a 
party to the communication or when 
one of the parties to the communica-
tion has given prior consent to inter-
ception, unless for the purpose of 
committing any criminal act. 
Oregon199 
All parties 
must be 
informed; 
consent not 
necessarily 
required 
A person may not obtain or attempt to 
obtain the whole or any part of a con-
versation by means of any device, 
contrivance, machine, or apparatus, 
whether electrical, mechanical, manu-
al, or otherwise, if not all participants 
in the conversation are specifically 
informed that their conversation is 
being obtained. 
Pennsylvania200 All Parties 
Unlawful to intentionally intercept or 
attempt to intercept any oral commu-
nication.  Exception applies when a 
person receives prior consent to inter-
cept oral communications. 
Rhode Island201 One Party 
Unlawful for any person to willfully 
intercept or attempt to intercept any 
oral communication, except in situa-
tions where the person, not acting un-
der color of law, is a party to the 
communication, or where one of the 
parties to the communication has giv-
en prior consent. 
 
 197. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52 (West 2017). 
 198. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176.4 (West 2017). 
 199. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540(1)(c) (West 2017). 
 200. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5704(4), 5703 (West 2017). 
 201. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-35-21 (West 2017). 
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South Carolina202 One Party 
It is lawful under this chapter for a 
person not acting under color of law to 
intercept an oral communication where 
the person is a party to the communi-
cation or where one of the parties to 
the communication has given prior 
consent to the interception. 
South Dakota203 One Party 
Unlawful for a person to intentionally 
and by means of an eavesdropping 
device to overhear or record a conver-
sation or discussion if he or she is not 
present during the conversation or has 
not received consent from a party to 
that conversation. 
Tennessee204 One Party 
Lawful for a person not acting under 
color of law to intercept an oral com-
munication where the person is a party 
to the communication or where one of 
the parties to the communication has 
given prior consent to the interception, 
except for tortious or criminal offens-
es. 
Texas205 One Party 
Person commits an offense if the per-
son intentionally endeavors to inter-
cept an oral communication.  It is an 
affirmative defense if a person not 
acting under color of law intercepts an 
oral communication if the person is a 
party to the communication, or one of 
the parties to the communication has 
given prior consent to the interception, 
unless intercepted for the purpose of 
committing an unlawful act. 
 
 
 202. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-30-10, 17-30-30 (2017). 
 203. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-35A-1, 23A-35A-20 (2017). 
 204. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-601 (West 2017). 
 205. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (West 2017). 
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Utah206 One Party 
A person commits a violation if he or 
she intentionally or knowingly inter-
cepts or endeavors to intercept any 
oral communication.  A person not 
acting under color of law does not 
commit an offense if he or she is a 
party to the communication or a party 
gives prior consent, unless the inter-
cepting is for tortious or criminal acts. 
Vermont207 
Consent 
from person 
being sur-
veilled 
No person shall be recorded in any 
format without that person’s consent 
while in a place where he or she would 
have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in a home or residence.  Security 
guards and private investigators within 
scope of their employment are ex-
empted. 
Virginia208 One Party 
Unlawful to intentionally intercept or 
attempt to intercept any oral commu-
nication, except where the person is a 
party to the communication or a party 
to the communication has given prior 
consent. 
Washington209 All Parties 
Unlawful for any individual or the 
State of Washington to intercept or 
record any private conversation, by 
any device electronic or otherwise, 
designed to record or transmit such 
conversation, regardless of how the 
device is powered or actuated, without 
first obtaining the consent of all the 
persons engaged in the conversation. 
 
  
 
 206. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-4 (West 2017). 
 207. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2605(d) (2017). 
 208. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (West 2017). 
 209. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (2017). 
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West Virginia210 One Party 
Unlawful for any person to intention-
ally intercept or attempt to intercept 
any oral communication.  It is lawful 
under this article for a person to inter-
cept an oral communication where the 
person is a party to the communication 
or where one of the parties to the 
communication has given prior con-
sent, except for criminal or tortious 
purposes. 
Wisconsin211 One Party 
Unlawful to intentionally intercept or 
attempt to intercept any oral commu-
nication.  Lawful if the person is a 
party to the communication or where 
one of the parties has given prior con-
sent, unless for tortious or criminal 
activities. 
Wyoming212 One Party 
No person shall intentionally intercept 
or attempt to intercept any oral com-
munication, except where the person is 
a party to the communication or where 
one of the parties to the communica-
tion has given prior consent, unless for 
criminal or tortious acts. 
 
 
  
 
 210. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1D-3 (2017). 
 211. WIS. STAT. § 968.31 (2017). 
 212. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-702 (West 2017). 
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